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In an interesting outline of 'Alternative approaches to 
macroeconomic theory' that underlie three current approaches 
to theoretical macroeconomics, Solow indicated his own prefer­
ence (subtitling his article as 'a partial view' - i.e., not 
impartial!, cf. Solow (1979)) for the fixed (or sticky) price 
models as being the most promising avenue for research in elu­
cidating the policy dilemma facing political economists. The 
other two he called the 'post-Keynesian approach' and 'equili­
brium theory'. The choice-theoretic framework - or, optimizing 
economic agents - seems to be the (only) common factor in the 
first and third approaches. However, in the latter approach, 
an additional strong hypothesis is made regarding equilibrium: 
fluctuations in aggregate variables is predicated upon an as­
sumption of market clearance. In the post-Keynesian approach, 
on the other hand, a sense of nihilism seems to prevail in 
that optimization, equilibrium and even dynamics - at least in 
the conventional sense of formalization in terms of differential 
equations - are all rejected in the abstractions implied in the 
modelling exercises approved by that school. Though it is dif­
ficult to be totally unsympathetic to the post-Keynesian critic­
isms, particularly in the forms in which Joan Robinson has de­
veloped them, on the unsuitability and even irrelevance of con­
ventional concepts and tools, the difficulty remains, as Solow 
(op.cit., p. 344) astutely observes, that this school has provided 
no systematic description or example of what it conceives to be 




























































































The policy dilemma itself is the problem of stagflation: 
its cures and origins. Disequilibrium theorists, using fixed- 
price models claim to have contributed, at least, to an eluci­
dation of the origins of, if not the cure to, one half of the 
stagflation problem; i.e., the distinction, important for policy 
purposes, between unemployment which results from a lack of ef­
fective demand to that which results from inappropriate levels 
of the real wage. Between the Scylla of lack of effective de­
mand (not least due to low real wages and unemployment!) and the 
Charybdis of high real wages (and a third, generally neglected 
classification) the economy must steer a careful course which, 
in general, implies in fact unemployment.
Equilibrium theorists, on the other hand, emphasizing 
monetary disturbances, attribute fluctuations in levels of out­
put and employment to imperfect and non-uniform information (at 
least subjectively so). In this approach, however, the problem 
of dynamics - persistent fluctuations in aggregate variables - 
is tackled from the very outset. This is, of course, natural 
in view of the methodology adopted by this school, but also 
because the problem of stagflation is, by definition, a dynamic 
problem.
This has, unfortunately, not been the case in the disequi­
librium approach to macroeconomics (cf. Fitoussi (1983)). The 
problem of stagflation, in fixed-price models, has been tackled, 




























































































compartments - corresponding, in fact, to the twin horns that 
characterize stagflation: inflation and unemployment. In the 
first instance fixed-price models analysing the various permu­
tations that are possible when more than one market is allowed 
to exhibit disequilibria, have given almost deceptively clear 
characterizations of unemployment in the price-wage space.
Only then, in the next stage have wage-price dynamics been con­
sidered, but within each regime. This dichotomy leads, quite 
naturally, to considerations of switching problems. The traj­
ectory of a representative point, in the wage-price space (which 
is, usually, partitioned into the famous 3 regimes of Classical 
Unemployment, Keynesian Unemployment and Repressed Inflation, 
in the first, static, stage of analysis) will, in general,
'hit' one of the boundaries characterizing the different re­
gimes. At any such boundary the well known conditions for 
existence and uniqueness of solutions fails to hold because the 
initial conditions will be compatible with dynamics in more 
than one regime - unless, naturally, restrictive conditions are 
imposed. In recent attempts to combine disequilibrium statics 
and macrodynamics the technical problem of switching from one 
regime (say 'Classical Unemployment') to another (say 'Keynesian 
Unemployment') has been resolved by one of two ways. In the 
one case, where disequilibrium statics of the macromodel is 
combined with the assumptions of neoclassical growth theory,
(cf. for e.g. Ito (1980)) some variant of the original Marchaud 




























































































equations (cf. Filippov (1962)), Roxin (1965) or the survey 
by Bridgeland (1967 (a)(b) for recent revivals of this tradition - 
or, for an alternative exposition, the elegant discussion in 
Hajek (1968) esp. pp. 31-34). In the other case, inspired by 
Zeeman's work on the heartbeat and nerve impulses (cf. Zeeman 
(1973)), as in Blad (1981), regime switching has been formulated 
as a generalized relaxation oscillation problem by assuming the 
existence of different speeds of adjustment with respect to 
quantities and prices (cf. Guckenheimer (1973) esp. pp. 888- 
889) .
The attempt, therefore, to combine disequilibrium statics 
and macrodynamics revolves around switching from one regime to 
another. The analytical solution presupposes, in this case, 
that the boundaries are invariant with respect to trajectories 
that approach and attain values defining coordinates on the 
boundary. In the 'old fashioned' terminology of 'trade cycle' 
theory, as the full employment ceiling is approached and then 
attained, growth is blunted and cyclical elements are activated. 
The point, however, is that the ceiling itself is a fuzzy entity 
though it is, indisputably, a constraint (cf. below), just as 
the boundaries of the regions in the price-wage space in fix- 
price literature. It is inconceivable that the vector-field 
of macrodynamic variables in the direction of the boundaries 
('ceilings') will leave invariant the partition defining the 
boundaries in the price-wage space. Indeed, in his pioneering 




























































































under which 'the partition of the price-wage space moves' 
(I-lalinvaud) (1977) esp. ch. Ill) . These conditions turn out 
to be as can be expected, those that are typical of macro­
dynamic models (technical progress, variations in the distribu 
tion of income induced by inflation, etc.). If, therefore, 
macrodynamics is taken seriously, the conflation with disequi­
librium statics to discuss stagflation, particularly from a 
policy point of view, cannot proceed satisfactorily by formal­
izing regime switches. The formalizing should consider the 
'movement of the partition of the w-p space' (Malinvaud (op. 
cit., p. 88) as a function of the macrodynamic coordinates 
characterizing the point of the boundary to which the vector 
field collapses - if at all.
Admirable as the above efforts are, and have been in 
clarifying several crucial problems in technique and concepts, 
it appears as if the 'disequilibrium static' starting point 
was inappropriate - particularly in view of the fact that the 
whole apparatus of disequilibrium macroeconomics seems to have 
been (at least in recent years, even if not in inception) a 
tool for the analysis of an inherently dynamic problem: i.e., 
stagflation. The uneasy feeling persists that 'dynamics' has 
been grafted onto an inherently static system, almost as an 
afterthought, in several ad-hoc ways.
This, of course, is not the case in the framework adopted 
by the 'equilibrium school'. However, quite apart from the 
sweeping assumptions about the economy always being in equi­




























































































variables is, itself, explained largely, if not solely, by 
(subjective) expectational errors. It is, however, possible 
to show, by means of a simple variant of the model we present 
below, that irregular fluctuations may persist in a non-random 
model (so-called "chaotic" dynamics or 'strange attractors' of 
dynamical systems) even if we grant all the assumptions under­
lying the models generating 'equilibrium business cycles': 
i.e., granting all assumptions with the exception of so-called 
(subjective) expectational errors. This result would seem to 
leave the explanation of the problem of persistent fluctuations 
in unemployment hanging by its own bootstrap in 'equilibrium 
business cycle' models.
'Stylised facts' in economics, like truth, according to 
Dr. Stockman in Ibsen's 'Folkefiende' (An Enemy of the People), 
seem to have a life of about twenty years. The one exception, 
almost confirming, by being the exception, Dr. Stockman's 
profound observation, at least in capitalist economies of the 
mixed type, seems to be the indisputable observational fact of 
growth cycles in employment and output, against a backdrop of 
rising government activity. To be more precise, the interaction 
between real wages, profits, investment and capacity utilization 
seems to be such that, with increasing government activity 
(measured, for example, by the ratio of government expenditure 
in total output), growth cycles in output and employment have 
become endemic in so-called mixed economies of the advanced 
capitalist type. The dynamical relationsthip between real 




























































































that, whatever the policies adopted, i.e., whether Keynesian, 
classical or Monetarist, fluctuations in functional income 
distribution seem to be the result. It is, of course, possible 
that misplaced policies, eg., Keynesian policies to a classical 
situation, are the source of these fluctuations of an economy 
incessantly in search of "An Appropriate Income Distribution" 
(Malinvaud (1980)). If this were the case, the contributions 
of the fix-price models, even with ad-hoc dynamics, should be 
considered fundamental. On the other hand, if it was the case 
that no natural constraints exist in an economy (say, no "floors" 
and/or 'fceilings" in the classic Hicksian sense) then the 
fluctuations may well have been caused by the rigidities induced 
by discretionary economic policy (whether monetary or fiscal) 
rather than sticking to 'rules'. The fact that neither of these 
properties are true makes it necessary to formulate models in 
such a way that dynamics in the presence of various constraints 
are considered from the very outset. The existence of constraints, 
for eg., the indisputable one of "full employment", implies 
that "rules" will have to be changed which, in turn, means 
that "rules" without "discretion" will be meaningless. On the 
other hand, the dynamical implications of sustained policies, 
as so clearly and controversially brought to the forefront of 
macroeconomics by the rational expectations school, is that 
behavioural functions change as learning and adaptation pro­




























































































ducing shifts in the boundaries)."^
The model we present here is based on a return to the 
tradition of old-fashioned cycle theory but with growth - i.e., 
a theory of growth cycles.
In this paper, at least methodologically, we try to 
combine from the very outset, in a simple way, the two central 
themes of the 'equilibrium' and 'fixed-price' macroeconomists: 
dynamics and disequilibria. It has always seemed to us that 
much is to be gained by emphasizing more one part of the funda­
mental message of the 'correspondence principle': 'one interested
only in fruitful statics must study dynamics' (Samuelson (1947) 
p. 5) or 'in order for the comparative-static analysis to yield
1) Either way, the result will be fluctuations in growth rates 
of output and employment now nudging the share of wages one 
.way and again nudging it another way; now to restore profit­
ability and then, again, to re-establish levels of demand 
compatible with productive potential; all the while imply­
ing, and implied by, the existence of the state for social, 
political and economic reasons. Socially, the necessity and 
desire to achieve fairer distributions of income and wealth 
implies, in the simplest of models, variations in the propen­
sity to consume. Politically, the need to retain power may 
induce governments to activate fiscal and monetary policies 
such that the elements conducive to the formation of 'Political 
Business Cycles' will be compounded; and, economically, the 
need to utilize efficiently, and create optimally, appropriate 
capacity, may call forth policies not compatible with the 
social and political aims. In this complex maze of social 
conflicts, political ideologies and economic efficiency to 
concentrate exclusively on one or the other of the three 
spheres, as existing models seem to do, is quite clearly 
myopic.
Encouraging signs that both fixed-price theorists and equi­
librium methodologists are moving in directions that seem 
to recognize the existence of such an interaction are emerging 




























































































fruitful results, we must first develop a theory of dynamics'
2)(Samuelson, op.cit., pp. 262-263, italics added).
Working backwards from the inherent dynamics of defini­
tional equations stated in terms of ratios so as to circum­
vent some technical difficulties arising out of working in 
terms of levels we develop a simple model of disequilibrium 
and persistent fluctuations in the labour and product markets 
resolved by variations in the functional distribution of 
income. Our starting point, though it may not be evident 
in the formalization, is the class of models in the tradition 
of Goodwin (1967), Solow-Stiglitz (1968) and Akerlof-Stiglitz 
(1969 - cf. esp. p. 273, footnote 1).
1) cont.nd
cussion on "An Appropriate Income Distribution" and Lucas 
(1981), especially pp. 289-291). But this, after all, was 
the message of old-fashioned trade cycle theory! Indeed 
some of the modern theorists do acknowledge this - Malinvaud 
■in particular; others pass on, dismissing that paradigm on 
the grounds that behavioural relations (in old-fashioned 
trade cycle theory) have not been derived from a choice- 
theoretic framework. (They do not, of course, explain the 
transfer from individual choice-theoretic frameworks to 
aggregate relations except by assuming "representative 
agents" - without realizing that these assumptions are 
equivalent to assumptions about "homogeneous labour" and 
"equal organic composition of capital" in that, other, much 
maligned tradition of Marxian economics.)
2) Yet another point to be emphasized in developing a theory 
of dynamics for the macroeconomy - also elegantly described 
in Samuelson's Nobel Prize Lecture - is that only very 
special dynamical systems are implied by useful underlying 





























































































In these early and pioneering approaches some assumptions 
were made in the interests of retaining the possibility of 
planar dynamics so that graphical (phase-plane) techniques 
could be utilized. This was explicit, for example, in the 
case of Solow-Stiglitz (op.cit., p. 320) and implicit in the 
case of Goodwin (disequilibrium only in the labour market).
In the model we develop these restrictive assumptions 
are relaxed whilst retaining the focus on the central problem 
of stagflation. In addition an attempt is made to avoid some 
of the weak points we have outlined with respect to the fixed- 
price and equilibrium models.
Thus, in §2, the framework and notations of the model are 
made precise. In §3, some general results for the complete 
model are presented. In §4, some simple special cases of the 
model will be analyzed to illustrate not only the techniques 
but also to elucidate the role of the assumptions in the dyna­
mic workings of the model. Finally, in a concluding §5, some 
directions for further developments, within the class of models 





























































































2.1 : The Framework
Instead of the usual procedure of beginning from the 
behavioural, technical, and definitional equations of an ag­
gregative economy, we commence, from the very outset, with 
identities, expressed as ratios, from which we derive the in­
herent dynamics of a closed economy of a 'more-or-less' capital­
istic variety. The canonical framework will not include, ex­
plicitly, government activities; we will also abstract from the 
complications of an open economy. However, we will indicate, 
at the end of this section, the nature of the modifications that 
must be considered if our basic model must be extended to in­
clude these extra complications.
The essential forces characterizing stagflationary econo­
mies are determined (in the simplest case of a one-good, closed 
economy, without an explicit role for the state) by the disequi- 
libria in the labour market, product market and the dynamic 
relationship between productivity and real wages. These, in 
turn, depend crucially on capitalists' decisions to create 
new capacity in conjunction with their decisions on the de­
gree to which utilization of existing capacity is compatible 
with considerations of profitability. The demand side of the 




























































































mining the choice of technique in the economy. Clearly, this 
too is a decision variable of the capitalists in our simplified 
economy. Three dimensions, therefore, make up the decision 
space of the capitalists (if we abstract from price formation), 
viz: level of investment (or creation of capacity), choice of
technique (or capital intensity) and rate of utilization of 
existing capacity. Of these three, we will ignore explicit 
considerations of the problem of capacity utilization; it 
will, however, become clear that the extent to which capacity 
is sub-optimally utilized is reflected in the disequilibrium 
in the product market and the decisions, by capitalists, to 
create new capacity.
The crucial ratios are, therefore, the following three:
u (1 )
v LN (2 )
and y YdYs (3)
where:
u : share of wages 
v : (un-)employment ratio
y : ratio of demand to supply in the product market 
w : money wage rate 
p : price level 




























































































N : Labour supply
Ys : Supply of Output or Productive Potential (real) 
Yd : Demand for Output (real)
Taking logarithmic derivatives of the identities (1) ~(3) 
that have been expressed as ratios, we get:
and, Y,
1 = JL
Y Y, (6)d s
It is quite clear from these dynamic relations that the 
aggregate dynamics of a stagflationary closed economy (with 
no explicit role for the government) will depend on the deter­
minants of the rates of growth of : real wages , product­
ivity, labour supply , output ̂ a n d  demand
(S
In the next subsection we discuss the specifications of
the relations determining the dynamics of income distribution 




























































































2.2 : Model Specifications
2.2.a : Productivity or Productive Potential;
In the usual neo-classical models of an aggregative
economy productive potential is formalized in terms of the
well-known production function. However, as Solow (op.cit.)
has persuasively argued, it is no longer sufficient to have only
a "technical" interepretation of the productive potential in
3)an economy. Growth in real wages, according to Solow, en­
capsulating "morale, productivity and quality effects" must 
be an argument in any relation depicting the productive potential 
of an economy. In looking, therefore, for a specification of 
the development of productive potential of an economy we have, 
in addition to the above requirements, to take into account 
also consistency with useful and feasible microfoundations 
both from an engineering and an economic point of view. From 
an economic point of view, once the level of capacity is deter­
mined, the decision on choice of technique, we assume, is based 
on considerations of the (expected) benefits of cost reduction.
3) "It has always struck me as a more substantial mystery that 
employers do not more aggressively push for wage reductions 
in a buyers' market.
An extension of the argument (i.e., a rationale for in­
cluding the relative wages as an argument in the preference 
functions (which amounts to including income distribution as 
an argument in the preference function)), can close the 
gap.... One can .... formalize this .... by the unconven­
tional devise of including the wage as an argument in the 
firm's production function to represent the morale, product­
ivity, and quality effects in a summary way"
(Solow, op.cit., p. 347 ;cf. also Solow (1979a).
Clearly, if the wage enters the production function in an 
essential way, it is not possible to resort to the usual 




























































































On the other hand, from an engineering point of view, taking 
a hint from Johansen's lucid discussion of the Kurz-Manne study 
(cf. Johansen (1972) pp. 190-195 and Kurz and Manne (1963)) , it 
seems reasonable to attempt to relate output per unit of labour 
to capital per unit of labour. This relation, at the firm and 
engineering level, can be interpreted as Johansen's "technique 
relation" (cf. Johansen (op.cit.), p. 21, equation 2-17) from 
which a Johansen-type short-run macro production function can 
be derived.
Combining a relationship between output per unit of labour 
and capital per unit of labour with the influence of factor 
costs that have implications both for factor proportions and 
productivity (i.e., choice of technique on the basis of econo­
mic considerations ) we obtain a specification which is a hybrid 
of the Kaldor (1957), Kennedy (1964), Solow (op.cit.) vision of
the development of productivity and productive potential in an
4)economy:
where
K : Capital^ and n > 0,
4) All functions, unless otherwise stated, will be assumed to 
be continuous and smooth - i.e., c' functions. It is easy
to show that ' Verdoon'-type considerations can also be encap­
sulated in our formalization without undue extra complications.
5) Note: ft is a functional relation, i.e., (7) is a general,
non-linear function. It must also be noted that it is a re­
lation about the supply potentials of the economy and,




























































































we can rewrite (7) as follows:
and, we get, after rearranging:
(8)
(9)
2.2.b : Investment Behaviour
Paralleling the dominance of the concept of the production 
function to describe productive potentials and productivity, 
the theory of investment behaviour has, almost without exception, 
been based on the neo-classical theory originated by Jorgensen 
(1963). It is, however, also well known that the rate of in­
vestment, whether optimal or not, is indeterminate in the class 
of models descending from the approach formalized along the 
lines suggested by Jorgenson. This remark applies also to the 
models incorporating classical versions of the flexible accele­
rator. Several ad-hoc methods to circumvent the problem of in­
determinateness have been suggested, notably by Lucas (1967) 
and Uzawa (1969). These ad-hoc variants rely on giving more 
structure to neo-classical models in terms of adjustment or 
installation costs that constrain the achievement of a desired 
capital stock infinitely fast. It has recently been shown by 
Hayashi (1982) and Yoshikawa (1980) that the neo-classical 




























































































some conditions, equivalent to the so-called "q" theory of 
investment. Thus, in recent macrodynamic models, the "q" theory 
of investment behaviour has been directly incorporated (cf. 
Buiter (1979), p. 125, equation 12, for example). Following 
the type of analysis indicated in Hayashi, it can be shown 
that, at the micro level, if economic behaviour is modelled as 
maximization of the (expected) present value of the net profits 
stream subject to an Uzawa-type installation function (cf.
Uzawa (1969), pp. 639-641 and figure 4, p. 640), then invest­
ment is simply a function of "q" or the "valuation ratio" (cf. 
Kaldor (1966), appendix pp. 316-19, and Kahn (1972), chapter
In the Cambridge version, the relationship between in-
7)vestment behaviour and the valuation ratio is derived on the 
basis of equilibrium in the securities markets, whereas in the 
hands of Uzawa, Hayashi and Yoshikawa the derivation is based 
on some form of inter-temporal optimization. If, within the 
context of our model - especially taking into account equation 
(9) - we follow the latter method, it will not only be necessary 
to increase the dimensions of the dynamical system ((4) - (6)),
6) It is interesting to note that not only is the neo-classical 
theory of investment modified by including adjustment or 
installation costs equivalent to Tobin's "q" theory of in­
vestment, but also the Cambridge theory of investment, at 
least in the hands of Kaldor (op. cit.), Kahn (op.cit.) and 
Wood (1972), when based on microlevel considerations in a 
rigorous fashion, reduces to the same formulation.
7) There is some confusion, in the early literature on linking 
investment behaviour to a valuation ratio, between marginal 
and average concepts (cf. however, Hayashi (op.cit.), for a 




























































































but it will also lead to technical complexities without cor­
responding analytical benefits for the main problems of this 
paper. If we follow the former method, we not only incorporate, 
in an essential way, conditions that determine clearance of 
the securities market but also are able to consider the sav- 
ings-investment identity without violating our basic assumption 
about disequilibrium in the product market. We assume, in any 
case:
| = | =  I (q) , I>0,1' >0 .....  (10)
and I : real gross investment, (cf. also Oulton (1981) , 
in particular §2.3, pp. 183-185 and equation (30), p. 185.)
We have, however, claimed that our exercise is a return 
to the tradition of old-fashioned trade cycle theory. In that 
sense, the fact that a q-theory of investment can be derived 
from a flexible-accelerator type of model (or desired stock 
of capital model - cf. Oulton (op.cit.)) substantiates, to 
some extent, our claim. It must be noted, however, that implied 
in the "Cambridge" derivation is some concept of an "equilibrium 
or "natural" rate of profit - i.e., a rate of profit compatible 
with equilibrium in the securities market and a savings-invest- 
ment identity parametrized by that rate of profit. Clearly,
Y
then, a realized rate of profit given, in our model, by (1-u)^,i\
not compatible with such an "equilibrium" rate must imply price 




























































































or both. We turn, therefore, now to price - and wage - 
dynamics.
2.2.c : Price-Wage Dynamics
We make no effort to go beyond conventional wisdom in 
postulating (behavioural) relationships for price- and money- 
wage dynamics - except, of course, that since money is purely 
accommodating we do not consider one of the 'conventional' al­
ternative: i.e., that of money supply and money demand deter­
mining the price level. It is not, however, difficult to re­
formulate the model (after including some features of an open 
economy and an essential role for government) so as to proceed 
to the determination of the price level and its dynamics along 
these neo-monetarist lines. This we leave for a different 
exercise. On the other hand, we are sufficiently unconventional 
to reconsider the price dynamics proposed by Wicksell (1898).
Clearly, the valuation ratio (which is, in any version, 
a relation between the market value of securities and the ac­
counting value of assets) encapsulates, when changing, the 
central idea of Wicksell: the discrepancy between the market 
rate and the 'natural* rate of interest. (Though Wicksell was 
disturbed, all through his life in economics, about the concept 
of the natural rate of interest - derived from his deep and
8) This way of posing the problem meets some of the important 
objections raised by Leijonhufvud in his outstanding essay 
on 'Wicksellian Themes" (cf. Leijonhufvud (1981), chapter 7) 





























































































dedicated study of Bohm-Bawerk's theory of capital - and con­
tinued to shift ground regarding the theoretical necessity and
9 Vsoundness of such a concept , he never deviated from his original 
interpretation of the level and rate of change of money prices. )
Investment, we have seen, is an increasing function of the valuation 
ratio. It is then only a natural step in consistency as well to 
consider specifications of price dynamics in terms of the valuation 
ratio, where, now, the latter could be used as a proxy for the
9) Indeed in our opinion the definite statement with respect to 
the 'natural rate of interest' was made by Sraffa in his 
celebrated discussions with Hayek in the pages of the Economic 
Journal in the early 30's (cf. Sraffa (1932a, 1932b), and 
Hayek (1932)). In fact the important chapter 17 of the General 
Theory also derives from these Wicksellian themes, as is clear 
from Keynes' footnote in that chapter referring to Sraffa.
10) "The exchange of commodities in itself, and the conditions 
of production and consumption on which it depends, affect 
only exchange values or RELATIVE prices: they can exert 
NO DIRECT INFLUENCE WHATEVER ON THE ABSOLUTE LEVEL OF MONEY 
PRICES.
For a single commodity or group of commodities, the esta­
blishment on the market of an incorrect relative price re­
sults in an inequality between supply and demand, between 
production and consumption, and this sooner or later effects
the necessary correction. But if, ..... . the prices of
all commodities, or the average price level, is for any 
reason forced up or depressed, there is nothing in the con­
ditions of the COMMODITY market that is calculated to bring 
about a reaction.....
.... If there is any reaction whatever away from a GENE­
RAL level of prices that is too high or too low, it must 
originate somehow or other from OUTSIDE the commodity market 
proper.....
.... one thing is certain: money prices, as opposed to
relative prices, can never be governed by the conditions of 
the commodity market itself (or of the production of goods); 
it is rather in the relations of this market to the MONEY 
MARKET, in the widest sense of the term, that it is neces­
sary to search for the causes that regulate money prices."




























































































discrepancy between the so-called market rate of interest and 
an accounting rate of profit. It is, however, also true that 
specifications of price dynamics, in aggregative models have, 
almost always, been based on one of two considerations: either
on excess demand ruling in the product market or on some form 
of mark-up principle due, in turn, to imperfect competition in 
the product market (or a combination of the two). Retaining 
agnosticism for theoretical purposes we postulate, therefore:
£ = / (u,y;q) .....  (11)
where /^ > 0 and /  ̂ > 0.
The problem of wage formation and wage dynamics must, of course, 
be subjected to the same strictures as those hoisted upon spe­
cifications of price dynamics. In particular, when no meaning­
ful marginal productivity determinants of the wage rate can be 
extracted, it seems natural to resort to bargaining theoretic 
rationale. This must be particularly compelling in highly
10) cont.nd
Though there seems to be a minor contradiction between the 
third and fourth quoted paragraphs, the message is unambiguous­
ly clear. And, then, in discussing propositions trying to 
base the specification of the absolute level of money prices 
on the basis of cost of production reasonings, he was equally 
categorical in the denial:
"In any case, the proposition that prices of commodities 
depend on their costs of production and rise and fall with 
them has a meaning only in connection with RELATIVE prices.
To apply this proposition to the general level of money prices 
involves a generalization whiGh is not only fallacious but 
of which it is in fact impossible to give any clear account."




























































































industrialized, heavily unionized mixed-capitalist economies 
of the Western variety - the type of economy we have in mind 
in our modelling and specification considerations. We make no 
effort, therefore, in this case as well to go beyond conventional 
wisdom in postulating a behavioural function for money-wage 
dynamics (indeed, not even as far as that, though no particular 
analytical difficulties are involved if the full paraphernalia of 
"expectation economics" must also be included). An attempt is 
made, however, to be as general as possible so that not only 
Phillips-curve wisdom but extensions in terms of various forms
of expectations can, if necessary, be extracted. Thus, we
assume:
Y • \w f p , s
w - 9 ■- £)) ___  (12)l  y
where g - > 0  ^±, ••••ii•H
and g . $ 0
1
Wage dynamics, therefore, is assumed to depend - on the basis 
of a bargaining rationale - on disequilibria in the labour and 
product markets, inflation and productivity; in addition, re­
taining the bargaining theoretic rationale, the income distrib­
ution variable is introduced to encapsulate the type of trade­





























































































2.2.d : Labour Supply
Labour demand in a mixed capitalistic economy should be 
an endogenous consequence of government expenditure decisions, 
capitalistic decisions on creation and utilization of capacity 
and, finally, also based on capitalists' criteria for choice 
of technique. On the other hand, we have argued for the in­
clusion, based on wage-fund reasonings and bargaining rationale, 
of functional income distribution as a proxy for the wage bill 
in the relation for money wage dynamics. It will be stretching 
the domains of economics too far to claim that labour supply 
should also be endogenous. Demographic, social and political 
factors are, surely, far more important as determinants of 
labour supply than purely economic factors. It has, however, 
been a tradition - even up to the time of Wicksell (cf. the 
first edition of Wicksell's lectures (Wicksell (1901)) - to 
include population dynamics in macrodynamic analysis. Until 
the recent revival of neo-classical economists' interest in 
problems of work-leisure choice, labour supply was considered 
as purely exogenously determined or alternatively some variant 
of the classical assumption of dependence upon growth in real 
wages was used. If we follow the neo-classicals all the way, 
the choice-theoretic basis would be something like: maximize 
utility subject to an upper limit on feasible supply of labour 
(and the other, usual, budget constraints) with the contributions 
of work interprete_d as disutility. This latter approach seems, 




























































































especially for the type of economies for which these relations 
are being considered: advanced, mixed capitalist economies of 
the Western type. Ideally, our macrodynamic model should be 
coupled to a demographic-aggregative no doubt - model deter­
mining population dynamics. Since this task, though not im­
possible, will detract from the main purpose of this paper 
we opt for an assumption of exogeneity for labour supply.
It must, however, be pointed out that classical assumptions 
on labour supply can easily be included; indeed, even a neo­
classical, choice-theoretic assumption would be consistent with 
the model being d e v e l o p e d . T h e  latter we have eschewed be­
cause it is too simplistic and violates too many of the true 
dimensions of population dynamics. The former we have ignored 
because it seems unrealistic for modern economies (cf. Tirelli 
(1983) for a lucid discussion on the development of thought 
regarding the problem of labour supply). Thus, we assume:
where y^o
2.2.e : Model Reduction
In 2.2.a 'v* 2.2.d we have considered all the necessary 
building blocks for our model - no more is necessary. Some
11) It is easy to see that classical assumptions such as
fit into the framework that we are considering. Neo­
classical alternatives are also easy to include in our 
framework. However, since we have nowhere specified the 
functions of a utility maximizing individual, some re­
specifications would be required.






























































































elementary mathematical manipulations is all that is now 
required to derive a reduced form dynamical system in u, v and 
y. This we proceed to do now. Substituting (11) and (12) in 
(9), we get:
Ì - a { r < ^  -L u,v,y,/(.;q)
/(.;q) 1 (14)
We can rewrite (13) as:
- ^ ) fu,v,y,q} 
.....  (15)
Assuming an appropriate form of the implicit function theorem 
with respect to labour productivity, we get:
“ è = 0 /u 'v /Y/q] .... . <16)s u s -1






Using (17) and (18) we can rewrite (16) as:
^ = 0 (|,u,v,y,q) .....  (19)
To be consistent with our two-stage decomposition of the 
capitalists decision process where, at one stage (and apparant- 




























































































is determined and at another stage the problem of choice of
12)technique is resolved, we now consider the latter problem.
The basic capitalist program in choice of technique or
capital intensity is assumed to be a behavioural rule which
13)attempts to maximize the reduction in unit costs . In 
words, the rule amounts to maximizing the weighted reduction 
in unit labour and materials costs where, in our one good 
closed economy model, the latter reduce to capital costs and 
the weights are the respective productivities. Thus, we have, 
as the capitalists' program on capital intensity and its deter­
mination, the following:
12) It is of course conceivable that this is an improper pro­
cedure - i.e., the two-part decomposition of the capitalists' 
decision process. However, inspired by Kuczynski's (1983) 
"Letter from No" we have endeavoured to try to capture the 
essence of those features that also reflect the separation 
of control from ownership in modern firms. That, is our 
main justification for this separation. Analytically, no 
great difficulties will be involved in a simultaneous solu­
tion. There is no implication of strategic considerations 
with respect to the sequential nature of the decision process
13) The problem is to account for the impact of changing rela­
tive factor prices on the choice of techniques. The expected 
benefit from a cost reducing choice is, clearly, the sum of 
reductions in input requirements weighted by the price of 
each factor. This, in turn, amounts to, the sum of the 
reductions in labour requirements, weighted by the unit costs
of labour, plus the reduction in capital requirements, 
weighted by capital costs. We have, in the text, made an 
inversion in the role for weights for obvious reasons. A 
similar approach to the problem of capital intensity, though 
in a somewhat broader context of research and innovation, 
is taken by Hans P. Binswanger in a series of interesting 




























































































Maximize the reduction in:
I u + | <1‘u> .....  (2°)
subject to the technical progress function (given by (19)):
^ = 0 (|,u,v,y;q) .....  (19)
This program results in an optimal factor intensity given, 
implicitly, by:
9i = .....  (20)
Assuming, once again, an appropriate form of the implicit 
function theorem- we can write the above as:
| = C (u,v,y;q) .....  (21)
Given, now, (21) we get, by straightforward substitution, from
(19) :
^ = t (u,v,y;q) .....  (22)
There is a long tradition, both in the theoretical and empirical 
literature, of discussion regarding the effects on factor in­
tensity of so-called factor-price distortions. The way we 
have formulated our model makes it clear that there is no 
unicausal relation with respect to direction between the 
problem of choice of techniques and factor prices. In the 
older and more neo-classical literature it was possible to 




























































































choice-theoretic problem was subject to the constraints of a 
standard production function. In our case, on the wage side, 
distortion - even if meaningful - can only be considered if 
the criterion which is the basis of wage bargaining is known. 
On the price side, as would be clear from our discussion in 
§2.2.c, it is almost a meaningless question. Thus, on the 
wage side, if the bargaining on the side of labour is based 
on a criterion function weighting employment against real 
wages, then distortion could be measured, from their (i.e., 
labour's) point of view, in terms of those weights. Three, 
at least, additional complications would then have to be 
considered:
a) The determination of the weights of the criterion 
function(s) for wage bargaining;
b) A more thorough consideration of wage-fund problems;
c) The conflict not only between labour and capital but 
that between employed and unemployed labour (or, 
almost equivalently, between unionized and non-union­
ized labour).
In related, but not yet integrated, work we are attempting to 
come to grips with those three aspects. Thus, in Rustem and 
Velupillai (1983) we have considered (a). In Fitoussi-Nuti 
(1983) the problem of wage-fund theory is considered and, 
implicitly, in Velupillai (1982) the conflict situation des­
cribed in (c) is considered. The task, however, is to inte­




























































































Now, from (11), (12) and (22) and substitutions in (4), 
we can determine the reduced form dynamics of functional in­
come distribution:
H = F(u,v,y-,q) .....  (23)
By an accounting identity, on the basis of some simplifications 
that do not lead to loss of generality, we have:
pYd = (l-sw (v,u)} wL + {l-sc (u)> {pYs~wL}.... (24)
where:
s (v,u) : savings 'coefficient' out of (contractual) w
wage income
sc (u) : savings 'coefficient' out of profits income.
Dividing (24) by pY , we get:s
y = 1 + u {sc (u) - sw (v,u)} - s (u) 
Taking the time derivative of (25) we get:
dy dU r , x
= dt {sc (u) - sw (v,u) } + u>
'6sc (u) • dv
dt ÔU< dt















































































































However, substituting, in turn, (10) in (21) and then the 
result in (22) and using (13), the reduced form dynamics of 
disequilibria in the labour market can be determined. Thus, 
we have:
^ = G(u,v,y;q) .....  (28)
From (23), (26) ana (28) we can determine, finally, the
disequilibrium dynamics of the product market:
£ = H (u,v,y;q) .....  (29)
JL
The dynamical system represented by (23) , (28) and (29) is
the complete reduced form version for our analysis of stag­
flation. Before we make some remarks concerning extensions 
to an open economy with an essential role for governmental 
activity, it may be appropriate to discuss, in very broad 
terms, the mathematical structure of the dynamical system 
represented by (23), (28) and (29).
First of all, the way we have formulated the problem and 
derived the dynamical system, it can be seen that it is a 
system of three (non-linear) ordinary differential equations, 
parametrized by q, the valuation ratio (or Tobin's "q"). But, 
"richer" parametrizations are possible, for example, if the price equation 
is explicitly parametrized by the adjustment coefficient and the 
mark-up factor associated with a mark-up rule, then the dynamical 
system is parametrized by q, X and n. It is, of course, well
14) All further references to a dynamical system will be to




























































































known that even deceptively simple three-dimensional systems 
of ordinary differentail equations give rise to strange attractors 
(the Lorenz equation for example: cf. Lorenz (1963) and Sparrow 
(1983)) .
Secondly, in view of the fact that it is a system of three 
non-linear ordinary differential equations, we cannot proceed 
in the usual way to investigate the dynamics of the model: 
viz., appeal to the Poincare-Bendixson theorem and the associated 
concepts of planar dynamics.
Thirdly, the natural mathematical approach to the study 
of the dynamics of systems that may undergo abrupt changes in 
the characteristics of equilibrium states as certain parameters 
are varied (endogenously or exogenously) seems to be bifurcation 
theory (and its sub-branches: Catastrophe Theory, Synergetics,etc.). 
In the dynamical system we have derived, the parametrization with 
respect to q seems natural. Both policy - by influencing the 
prices and, therefore, yields on financial assets - and spon­
taneous exogenous factors influence the value of q and, in the 
aggregate, there is no need for the restriction q ^ 1. Thus 
investment and price dynamics depend, continuously, on q in 
some bounded interval - though hyper-inflationary possibilities 
need not be ruled out. Thus, a possible mathematical approach 
would be bifurcation analysis of the dynamical system with 
respect to q. In this way we can circumvent the unnatural and 




























































































Fourthly, perhaps we should take seriously Lorenz's 
pioneering methodology and investigate, by numerical integration, 
the possible dynamics of the system we have derived for various 
permutations of plausible values of the parameter(s).
Finally, there are intriguing possibilities if the dynamics 
of u, v and y can be associated with negative phase-space flow 
divergence (i.e., when ^ / ô u  + ^ / S v  + ^*V<Sy is a negative con­
stant) . It may then be necessary and useful to consider the 
exotics of Mandelbrot's fractal dimensions (cf. Mandelbrot 
(1983)).
Before we proceed to a few general results for the complete 
model some notes on possible extensions to an open economy with 
an essential role for government seems almost imperative if the 
model is not ot be considered an empty box from a policy point 
of.view.
Define:
v, _  G h ss. —
YS




































































































where x : value of exports (nominal) 
and M : value of imports (nominal) 
and h, A and A are the respective ratios of government expend­
iture, value of exports and value of imports to the level of 
output. To introduce government expenditure into our system,
for example, we can rewrite (24) as follows:
pY^ = (l-sw (v,u)}wL + (l-sc (u)}{pYs~wL}+ pG .....  (33)
Proceeding as before and dividing by pY we get:s
y = l-u(sc (u) - sw (v,u)}- sc (u) + — ■ .....  (34)
and thus:
y = l-u(sc (u) - sw (v,u)}- sc (u) + h .....  (35)
From (30) we have:
h G is .....  (36)
h G " Ys
If it is assumed that government expenditure is given exogenously 
then the dynamics of (23), (28) and (29) augmented by (36) can
be analysed in the 3-dim. space determined by the disequilibria 
in the product market, labour market and the functional distrib­
ution of income. If government expenditure is circumscribed by 
the possibilities due to feasible rates of direct taxation G 
becomes, at least in part, endogenous and a 4-dim. dynamical 
system must be analysed. If, finally, government revenue can 




























































































of an explicit interest rate, at the least, must be considered. 
Clearly the valuation ratio comes into its own in the latter 
case and the model will have to be complicated even more - though 
not in increasing the dimension. In a different exercise (cf. 
Fitoussi-Velupillai (1984) we explore some questions of the 
structure of public finance, so-called 'crowding-out' and ex­
change-rate dynamics. The hint to proceed along these lines is 
to note that investment is, in our model, a function of the 
valuation ratio which, in turn, depends almost directly on some 
concept of the market-rate of interest.
We do not go further into the problem of 'open-economy 









Depending on the basis adopted for including the trade flows
in the national accounts the modification to (33) is purely
formal. The rest proceeds as in the previous closed-economy
case or as in the system augmented by government expenditure.
It is also possible to proceed along IS-LM type of methodology
by assuming, as a constraint, continuous trade balance so that
consistently valued, is identically equal to unity. Such
an assumption helps to reduce the dimensions of the system.
However, in the short-run, the implications of the above as-




























































































an hierarchy of adjustment speeds can be assumed, in the sense 
that accounting conventions (or natural causes) constrain certain 
markets to be in 'balance' then the dimension of the system can 
be reduced. Thus, if we can assume that the exchange-rate is 
flexible to some degree and interest-rate variations are sufficient 
ly elastic, then, as in traditional macrodynamics (and indeed 
classical osciallation theory - viz. relaxation oscillations), 
we can assume the various money-markets 'clear' first and se­
quentially (cf. Leijonhufcud (1968), ch. II, in particular Ap­
pendix to ch. II, pp. 60-66). These notes we explore in Fitoussi- 
Velupillai (op. cit.).
However, a sketch of the possible way of considering these 
factors can easily be provided. Assume, for example, that de­
ficit financing (of the government budget) by means of simple 
money creation or bond financing (or a combination of both). 
Con\plications of the means, are, of course, possible. Then, 
the government budget constraint and its dynamics can be con­
sidered as follows:
P { G + | - t (Y) } = M + ! (38-a)
where: t : tax rate
R : rate of interest






























































































and 1 = (1_j) [P {G + | .....  (38-c)
Thus: j = 0 pure bond financing of the government account
j = 1 => pure money creation for the government account. 
Again, introducing, say, traditional LM-dynamics, we have, for 
example:
R = L (R, Y) - M .....  (38-d)
where : L : liquidity preference function
If, therefore, as reasoned above, we assume the existence of a 
hierarchy of adjustment speeds in the system, reflected in the 'in­
stantaneous' clearance of the money market, we can solve for 
R to get:
R = J (Y,M) .....  (38-e)
Given, a, G, t and R it is clear from (38-b) and (38-c) that M 
and B are functions of the endogenous variables of the dynamical 
system we developed earlier. In particular M and B are explicit 
functions of p and Y. Since we have not, explicitly, considered 
utility analysis for the 'consumer' the problem of asset choice 
does not surface in any dramatic way. Under these conditions, 
it is not clear that so-called 'crowding out' discussions have 
any sense at all. So long as no pathological factors enter into 
the demand for government securities and the q ratio behaves 
reasonably well there does not seem to be any justification for 
dramatic and drastic strictures against government activity at 
any level.





























































































§3. The Workings of the Complete Model
3.1 : Further Assumptions
We will proceed to the analysis of the dynamics of the 
complete model, in this section, in three stages. First, in 
§3.1 further assumptions about the nature and magnitude of local 
variations in the functions characterizing the model will be 
discussed. Next, in §3.2 we consider local stability analysis 
along well-known Routh-Hurwitz lines. Finally, in §3.3 we study 
the oscillatory properties of the system, parametrized by q, 
using Hoof's theorem. In an appendix to this section some un­
pleasant technicalities, necessary for the main text, can be found.
Variations in the distribution of income, the (un)employment 
ratio and the disequilibrium in the product market have effects 
on the respective dynamics that can be computed - at least for 
signs and (relative) magnitudes fairly directly, on the basis 
of assumptions in §2, from (A-3-2) ^ (A-3-10); with, however, one 
exception: itis clear from (A-3-8) ^ (A-3-10) that computation is 
not straightforward in the case- of the effects on the dynamics 
of the product market. For our immediate purposes we indulge 
in some heuristics - the rigorous basis of which, though not 
explicit, can be p r o v i d e d . T h o u g h  the effects of variations 
in the distribution of income on the disequilibrium dynamics 
of the product market is ambiguous (-^ * 0) , the other two




























































































effects are unambiguous: viz. < 0 and > 0. In words, 
as the disequilibrium in the labour market is reduced, product 
market disequilibria also diminishes, at least in proportional 
terms, in the former case; in the latter case heuristics are 
less transparent. It amounts to the paradoxical statement that 
attempts to reduce the discrepancy between Yg and increase 
the difference in proportional growth between supply and demand. 
This is really an aggregative and dynamic version of the so-called 
paradox of thrift and enters our model because of the way in 
which savings (and, hence, consumption) have been specified in
the accounting relation defining 'aggregate' demand.^6  ̂ We
JaHnow resolve the ambiguity in by assuming this to be negative
17)but almost negligible in magnitude to neutralize some of the 
paradoxes inherent in the immediately preceding assumption.
All the other partials have signs determined on the basis 
of the assumptions in §2. However, we still have to consider 
relative magnitudes before any proposition regarding the 
stability of equilibrium can be made. This we consider in the next 
sub-section.
16) It must be remembered that 'aggregate demand'is defined 
without including investment in (24) . Total demand, there­
fore, must be distinguished from the definition of Y^.
17) Mainly because it is a compounding of long-term factors on 



























































































3.2 : (Local) Stability of an Equilibrium Solution
Define A^, i = 1,2,3 as follows:
A = uSF vSG ySFA1 " 6u Sv Sy
uSF uSF vSG vSG uSF uSF
A2 " Su 5v Sv Sy Su Sy
+ +
vSG vSG ySH ySH ySH ySH
Su 5v Sv ^y Su Sy









On the basis of the assumptions in §2 and the discussion in 
the appendix to this section supplemented by footnote 17 (and 
the main text referring to this footnote) it is clear that 
A 3 > 0. (We will not state the results referring to equilibrium 
and (local) stability as formal propositions - reserving that 
status to a statement on the oscillatory properties of the 
model.) We can, therefore, by the inverse function theorem 
proceed to a discussion of the local stability of a singular 





























































































Once again, from the assumptions in §2 and appendix to §3, it 
is clear that the conditions for local stability are satisfied.
A minor digression may not be out of place at this point. 
Rewrite, in a compact way, the dynamical system defining the 
model (i.e., (23), (28) and (29)) as:
= xM(x;e) .....  (41)
Our aim now is to study the singular point(s) of the 
dynamical system defining movements in the functional distrib­
ution of income in response to disequilibria in the labour and 
product markets (and in terms of the reverse causality). This 
means we want to investigate the structure of zeroes for:
M(x; e) = 0 .....  (42)
where :
x e X
. and X is the cartesian product of the feasible region 
defining u, v and y.
and :
e £ £ where £ is the parameter space (defined by q and, 
say, the adjustment coefficient and the mark-up factor if the 
price equation was specified - as will be done in the next section, 
§4, appropriately).
In general we call a SOLUTION of (42) a point (x;E.)&Xx£ 
such that relation (42) will be satisfied. If we define
Z ={x«X; (x;e)€3} .....  (43)




























































































relation (43) holds for any e 6 £. In this form it is possible 
to recognize a respectable tradition in economic analysis - 
beginning with the 'Correspondence Principle' and progressing 
through any number of variants of so-called 'Comparative Statics' 
studies of models and their equilibria. Clearly, if Z is any 
closed set in Xx£ it would be impossible to systematically study 
Z£ as e is varied. On the other hand, if we confine our attention 
to the characterization of the solution set Z in a neighbourhood 
of a solution (x^e^) then, invoking some form of the implicit 
function theorem (as we have done above in appealing to the in­
verse function theorem), it would be possible to study ZEas £is 
varied in a neighbourhood of for x q . The procedure we have 
just described is the method of (static) bifurcation theory.
It is static because we compare the structure of the solution 
set for nearby values of the parameter. In slightly more tech­
nical language this means that an equivalence relation is 
defined on the solution set for investigations in terms of 
variations in the parameter. On the other hand, if the equi­
valence relation is defined on the vector field defining the 
system and if a study of its variations w.r.t. some parameter 
set is made, then the procedure is usually called dynamic bi­
furcation theory. Questions referring to structural stability 
belong to the domain of dynamic bifurcation theory. In all 
cases the real problem is to choose useful, intuitive and meaning­
ful equivalence relations. It is customary to consider topo­




























































































questions (cf. Velupillai (1983), (1984)). It may now be
more clear that bifurcation theory circumvents difficult analysis
where switching between regimes must be explicitly considered.
The price, of course, is to be paid in terms of the ingenuity 
with which equivalence relations can be usefully chosen. We 
shall proceed with the method of static bifurcation theory in 
the rest of our discussion in this section (§3) and for part 
of the discussion in §4.
Though we have not specified, explicitly, conditions guaran­
teeing uniqueness of the singular point (i.e., the solution set 
Z is to be a singleton) it may, for expositary purposes, be use- 
ful to imagine that this is so. ; Thus, from (39) and (40) 
we know that an equilibrium is locally stable implying, for 
this third order system in u, v and y, eigenvalues with negative 
real parts. To probe further into the local oscillatory char­
acteristics of the singular point further investigations into 
the structure of the eigenvalues will be necessary. To this 
we now turn.
18) The reason for not attempting a characterization of the
uniqueness of the singular point will be evident from even 
a cursory inspection of the simple Lorenz system (op.cit.). 
But this does not mean that we cannot isolate the study 




























































































3.3 : Oscillations in the 3-dim, system in u, v and v
In 2-dimensional systems the powerful Poincare-Bendixson 
theorem simplifies many difficulties in the investigation of 
oscillatory properties. The Poincare-Bendixson theorem (a 
version of which we use, implicitly, in §4 to prove a 'Classical' 
equilibrium) has no analogue in higher dimensions. As discussed 
in the previous sub-section it is, perhaps, more useful to 
approach the analysis of oscillatory properties as static or 
dynamic bifurcation problems. This we attempt now using one 
of the most famous theorems in this field: viz. the Hopf bi­
furcation theorem (cf. Marsden-McCracken (1976) for historical 
and analytical notes; also Hassard et.al. (1981) and Arnold 
(1983)) .
Proposition 3.1:
Under the assumptions of §2, Appendix to §3 and 3.1, 3.2, there 
exist values of q = q* such that the Jacobian of the dynamical 
system defined by (23) , (28) and (29) has a pair of pure imagin­
ary eigenvalues.
Proof
From 3.1, 3.2 and Appendix to §3 it follows that the eigen­
values have at most negative real parts. On the other hand, 
the discriminant of a third order equation:
f (x) = ax^ + 3bx^ + 3cx + d .....  (44)
for f(x) = 0  .....  (45)
































































































The criterion for pure imaginary roots is: 




Clearly, given the order of magnitude of the elements of
3 and and the fact that investment depends continuously
on q (with no restriction for the feasible range of q in the
19)aggregate), relation (49) is easily satisfied for some 
q = q * . Q.E.D.
It is now a matter of brute computation only to show that the 
conditions of Hopf theorem are satisfied for the dynamical 
system parametrized by q.
Proposition 3.2
Under the assumptions of proposition 3.1 the dynamical system 
(23), (28), (29) parametrized by q exhibits a Hopf bifurcation
(for the singular point under proposition 3.1).
Proof
For a precise statement of the Hopf theorem cf. Marsden-McCracken 
(op.cit.) or Hassard et.al. (op.cit.). It is only necessary to 
verify that the hypothesis of the Hopf theorem is satisfied and




























































































this requires only one extra complication. (The example in the 
next section is more explicit and intuition does not falter!).
Due to discussions in §2 we know that all constituent functions 
are sufficiently smooth and hence the dynamical system (23),
(28) and (29) are continuous and differentiable. By 3.1, 3.2 
the singular point under discussion is stable (locally, of course) 
From proposition 3.1, for q = q the Jacobian of the dynamical 
system at the singular point has a pair of pure imaginary eigen­
values. It is now necessary only to show that the real part of 
the imaginary roots - complex roots off the imaginary axis - 
crosses the imaginary axis with non-zero speed: i.e., we have 
to show for
X. = a. + i8. i = 1,2 .....  (50)i l l
X3 = - y .....  (51)
(where X^, i = 1,2,3 are the three eigenvalues of the Jacobian
at-a singular point)
that:
d.-re_a lg.*.). , „ ...... (52)
dq '
Once again, we omit computations but it is easy to show, using 
any one of the possible relations between the roots of an equation 
and the coefficients characterizing it that (52) holds. Thus 
all the conditions of the Hopf theorem.are verified and the dynamic­
al system defined by (23), (28) and (29) is characterized by a
one-parameter family of closed orbits in a neighbourhood of the 
equilibrium for q = q* .




























































































Some heuristic remarks are in order concerning the economic 
background to such an oscillatory behaviour branching off from 
a stable singular point. As the valuation ratio varies the 
system loses the characteristics of stable behaviour and oscil­
lates. For some range of values of q, any deviation away from 
the singular point sets up 'self-correcting' forces so that the 
system seeks automatically a return to those values of u, v and y 
characterizing a dynamic equilibrium (which, of course, does 
not necessarily mean, in the short run, equilibrium of supply 
and demand). As q varies beyond a certain fixed radius of 
values, the system loses its simple stability characteristics 
and oscillations are induced. Further variation of q can lead 
to exotic dynamics like a 'jump' to quite another equilibrium.
In this sense this type of analysis substantiates Leijonhufvud's 
important 'corridor' hypothesis (Leijonhufvud (1981), ch. 6, 
p. 109): i.e., for some 'corridor' of values of q ’optimal' 
policy may well be 'laissez-faire'. But the vagaries of q do 
not warrant 'rules' at any cost: discretion will be necessary, 
but only after the rough magnitudes that determine the 'size 
of the corridor' defining q can be ascertained. In the usual 
literature on Hopf's theorem it is not easy to find discussions 
on the possibilities of computing explicitly a range for q 
such that our 'corridor' can be determined in some meaningful 
sense (but cf.: Swinnerton-Dyer (1977)). Secondly, it is 
clearly not necessary to formulate 'regime changes' as difficult 




























































































methods, we have an elegant and simple way to view switches 
in regimes as well as oscillations: a switch from (asymptotically) 
stable behaviour to persistent oscillations as q varies due to 
exogenous factors.
How does the above analysis relate to fix-price analysis and 
New Classical Macroeconomics? We have discussed some of the 
relations above and will consider other affinities in §4. How­
ever, at this point, some remarks are in order.
The main characteristics of New Classical Macroeconomics 
depend on assuming prices and wages such that the product and 
labour markets clear. It is not always clear in this literature 
what meaning can be attached to the concept of equilibrium in 
the product (or, indeed, in the labour) market.
Assuming, however, that these definitional problems 
can be resolved, we can consider the above requirement in terms 
of setting G and H simultaneously to zero. Then the burden of 
adjustment, as always, falls upon that much misused concept: 
functional income distribution. This, in turn, is defined in 
terms of productivity and real wages. Now, adding the further 
requirement of rational expectations - in a deterministic con­
text, naturally, implying, perfect foresight - can we also infer 
invariance propositions? Clearly, not. The theoretical technology




























































































many more exotica than those allowed in planar dynamics and 
saddle-point characterizations. It is a priori impossible, 
even under conditions of perfect foresight for q and the para­
meters characterizing market clearing values for p and w, 
to choose dynamics analogous to saddle-point paths. To sub­
stantiate, analytically, these observations would take us beyond 
the limited scope of this exercise, but these are explored in 
Fitoussi-Velupillai (op.cit.).
A reverse procedure is adopted in the fix-price tradition. 
Clearly, even as the generic name of this tradition implies, 
setting / ((eq. (11)) and g (eq.(12)) simultaneously to zero,
we obtain the main characteristics of the analysis. If, in 
addition, productivity is assumed to be constant - as is usually 
done - then for F = 0 we have to consider the planar dynamics of 
G and H. In this case almost complete characterization of the 
dynamics is possible. A slightly modified approach, as an 
example of modelling in this tradition, is given in §4. But 
even without going into details it can be seen that the search 
for an 'appropriate income distribution' simply means find the 
locus of p and w (for given productivity) such that G and H 
have desired dynamics. It is, of course, not necessary to assume 
given productivity.
Since efficiency requirements dictate that fix-price analysts 
'search' for the income distribution that will characterize a



























































































analysis upon this requirement (of market clearing values), there 
does not seem to be much dividing the two schools. On the other 
hand, without assumptions guaranteeing uniqueness, the former 
approach falters on the impossibility or at least infelicity of 
comparing alternative Pareto-optima; the latter, Equilibrium 
Dynamics, analysis becomes meaningless when, in three dimensions 
(and higher) strange attractors generate exotic, but non-random and 
aperiodic fluctuations.
At least one more feature of New Classical Macroeconomics 
remains to be explored: the problem of monetary shocks genera­
ting observed fluctuations. Within the framework we have de­
veloped there is no need to have to appeal to ad-hoc stochastics 
though we are, of course, guilty of other ad-hockeries. An 
investigation, similar to that developed above, of a dynamical 
system depending on a parameter would suffice; in this case, 
all we need to do is to study the dynamics w.r.t. variations 
in'j to encapsulate the simplest considerations of monetary 
shocks. It is possible to go beyond. As for example, when 
the valuation ratio, for its market determinants, depends 
upon the extent to which government activity 'distorts' fi­
nancial markets. These considerations lead, more than has 
been indicated earlier, to direct and conventional approaches 
to macroeconomic policy analysis. We explore these directions 




























































































Appendix to § 3
We have :
^ = F(u,v,y;q)
^ = G (u, v , y ;q)
(23)
(28)
^ = H (u, v,y;q) (29)
To investigate, locally, stability characteristics of the model 
and to utilize the Hopf(-Friedrichs) theorem, we have to in­
vestigate appropriate partial derivatives. These we derive in 
this appendix:
For (23), (28) and (29) the Jacobian evaluated at a singular
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§4 Some Simple Special Cases
We propose to illustrate, with two simple examples, the 
versatility of the methodology and the workings of a model of 
the type we have developed. Anyone familiar with Goodwin's 
famous model of 'A Growth Cycle' (Goodwin (1967)) or the Akerlof- 
Stiglitz (op.cit.) model would recognize that the model we 
have developed in §2 is nothing more than a generalization of 
these pioneering works.
In Goodwin's model, for example, for initial conditions not 
compatible with the long-run equilibrium values, the economy 
generates fluctuations in functional income distribution and 
the (un-)employment ratio to resolve the conflict between capital 
and labour. Since Goodwin's model is a particular realization 
of our model in §2, we will use it as the first example to 
illustrate the use of the Hopf bifurcation theorem in an explicit
Example 1
Assume the following particular case of "Model §2":
i) Equilibrium in the product market
20) This example was presented by the second author at a seminar 
in honour of Goodwin held in Siena in April 1981. In the 
proceedings of that conference a similar result is given in 
the excellent paper by Cugno and Montrucchio. The proceed­
ings were published in late 1982 and became available to the 
present authors in 1983 when the first version of this paper 
had already taken shape. It would be possible to choose an­
other of Goodwin's models to illustrate the use of the Hopf 
theorem (cf. Velupillai (1982) - same proceedings as above) 




























































































ii) Add all other assumptions in the original Goodwin model 
(Goodwin (op.cit.)) except:
iii) Money-wage dynamics given by
5 “ / <v> + .....  (53)
/' > 0
iv) Price dynamics given by:
f = g(C * ^ f - p l / p )  .....  (54)
i.e.£ = g ( u — 1} .....  (55)
p
g' > 0, g (0) = 0.
Clearly, for 1 = 0  and linearization of / (v) the model reduces 
to Goodwin's original 'Growth Cycle'. (We can parametrize 
also in terms of savings propensities for a gneralization to 
illustrate the use of the Hopf-theorem.) Using, then, the 
notations for the particular assumptions as in Goodwin's original 
presentation, the dynamics of the share of wages and the (un-) 
employment ratio will be given by:
^ = / (v) - a - (l-X)g { tt u  - 1} .....  (56)
and
Z = ii=Hl - <a+6) .....  (57)
c
Let us, somewhat misleadingly, denote X as a "money-illusion" 
parameter. As pointed out above, when X=0 and / (v) is linearized 





























































































From the characteristic equation for
2
- trace J(u,v) . P + det J(u,v) = 
where for J(ufv) we have:
J (u, v) = / - (1-A)4?<5u
1
a
(56) and (57) we get:
0 .....  (58)
.....  (59)
and, therefore, the roots
p _ - (1-A) <Sg/5u 
1 ,2 2
By the assumptions of the
are:
+ J (1-A) 2^(6g/6u)2 |I(Zl)Jv g . (60)
original Goodwin model we have:
(61)
§16v > 0 (62)
Clearly, V A ( e. R) such that
U - M  < 2 ' (-ir) ...... (63)
the roots Pi 2 are (conjugate) complex.
Also, when:
A = 1, r a. Pi ̂ 2 = 0 ...... (64)
and d / \ \ . ■> .re.rp(A) at A — l
. . .....  (65)gives 1 > n
2 <5u
i.e., the dynamical system is such that the real part of the 




























































































All the conditions of the Hopf bifurcation theorem hold, which, 
therefore, implies that there exists a one-parameter family of 
closed orbits in a neighbourhood of the equilibrium for X = 1.
A conjecture: it is well known that the Lotka-Volterra system, 
and hence the system in the original Goodwin model for u and v 
is structurally unstable. It has generally been assumed that 
this is an undesirable property for systems depicting some 
aspects of real life situations. The above example, however, 
casts a surprisingly positive aspect of the property of 
structural (in-)stability: by studying the directions in which 
perturbation of such a system leads to qualitatively different 
phase paths, it will be possible to obtain information on useful 
parametrizations. There may, therefore, be a case for beginning 
with structurally unstable systems in the first stage of an 
analytical study. Classical Mechanics may be considered to be 
a canonical example for a case study of such a strategy.
Example 2:
In the previous simple example it is easy to verify that for 
X < 1 we get a convergent, albeit fluctuating path, to the 
long-run equilibrium configuration in the share of wages and the 
(un-)employment ratio. Even though the economics of the motion 
of the dynamical system has very many classical elements in it, 
a crucial component of the thought of that school is not incor­
porated in the simplified example 1: i.e., endogenization of



























































































This example, incorporating such a feature, is mainly for the 
purpose of illustrating the so-called ’Classical Unemployment' 
i.e., the generation of an unemployment equilibrium mainly due 
to real wages being high (but in conjunction with explicit dyna 
mics for productivity, pricing, labour supply and investment so 
that the Keynesian case due to too low effective demand can, 
if necessary, be discussed with minor modifications).
Assume the following particular case of "Model §2":
(in addition to assumption i) and ii) of example 1 above).
i) Investment relation is given by a simple conjunction 
of an accelerator principle and a profits terms. For 
example as in Kaldor (1957):
(where, of course, due to assumption i) of example 1 
Y is replaced by Y).' ' b
Under these assumptions, the dynamics of the share of wages 
and the unemployment ratio reduce to:
f- = f- * Y + f{ (1-u)^} (66)
^ = G (u, v) (67)
^ = H (u, v) (68)
such that the following assumptions hold:
(69)
Assuming also that real wages and the share of wages move with 




























































































the 'money illusion' parameter X < 1), we get:
(70)
We also assume:
lim H(u,v) > 0 for v < v and H(u,v) < 0 for v > v
(71)
lim G(u,v) > 0 for u < u and G(u,v) < 0 for u > u
v -»• 0 (72)
Roughly speaking these assumptions (valid, for example, in the 
original Goodwin 'Growth Cycle') mean the following: (in true
'classical' - in the Keynesian sense - vein):
a) Decreasing share of wages, leading to a rise in profit­
ability, increase more than proportionately the employ­
ment ratio, in some finite region of the (u,v) space.
. b) Similarly with the roles of u,v reversed.
For mathematical convenience, which does not violate any of the 
economic assumptions of the analysis, we assume that the H and 
G curves of the equilibrium state are such that their inverse 
images have distinct tangent lines. We can then state the 
following 'theorem', for the assumptions made in this section:
Proposition 4.1
The equilibrium state of the dynamical system represented 
by (67) and (68) are co-limit sets that do not contain closed 



























































































(Intuitively, this means, for any initial point in the (u,v)-plane 
where 0 ^u $1 and 0 <v Si, both u and v tend to some equilibrium 
state, i.e., an existence proposition for feasible initial con­
ditions. Thus, the intersection points of G ‘*‘(0) and H 1 (0) de­
termine the distribution of income and degree of unemployment 
compatible with any level of real wages. The interesting point, 
however, is that the same configuration of an equilibrium in the 
distribution of income and degree of unemployment can be realized 
with a model with more emphasis on Keynesian elements - i.e., 
lack of effective demand. The point of the morale of the story 
is to cast some doubt on the classification implied by methods 
of disequilibrium statics.)
Proof;
Consider the non-intersecting points of G ^(0) and H ^(0).
If v is taken along the horizontal axis and u along the vertical, 
any point on G ‘*'(0) which is not an intersection point, moves 
vertically; conversely, any non-intersection point on H ^(0) 
moves horizontally. Moreover, in the subspaces (in fact they 
are open sets) determined by the intersection points of G ‘*'(0) 
and H "'‘(0), the non-intersection points of G ‘*'(0) and H ^(0) 
point in the same direction. This means that they are monotone, 
hence ruling out closed orbits.
Clearly, the dynamical system defined by (67) and (68) is 
defined for all t > tQ = 0. Furthermore, Vt > t , the system 



























































































5 7  -
of the assumptions represented by (71) and (72). Thus, the 
set defined by 0 v < 1 and 0 < u .< 1 is an INVARIANT SET; i.e. 
since we have all along assumed that the various functions are 
continuous and smooth, we have a continuous mapping from a com­
pact set into itself. Then, by the Poincare-Bendixson theorem, 
since closed orbits are ruled out, there exists some equilibrium. 
In fact, because the domain of definition is an invariant set, all 
the to. limit points are equilibria and the proposition is proved.
Q . E . D .
We have, with some design, altered the investment function: partly 
to encapsulate so-called 'classical', 'Keynesian', etc. type of 
classification popularized by the 'fix-price' school; partly 
to show an alternative approach, using the Poincare-Bendixson 





























































































In the lengthy introduction some critical remarks were 
made regarding the methodology adopted by the fix-price macro­
economists. In that approach unnecessarily complicated mathema­
tical formalizations have been adopted to analyse so-called 
regime switches. We have tried to show that bifurcation theory 
provides, possibly, a conceptually much simpler and mathematically 
somewhat richer framework for analysing disequilibrium dynamics.
In addition, as illustrated in the second example of §4, even the 
economic classification of the methods of fix-price macroecono­
mists may not be unambiguous.
On the other hand, the excessive claims of New Classical 
Macroeconomists on 'Methods' to analyse aggregate fluctuations 
seem highly misplaced. The 'theoretical technology' of 
Lucasian macroeconomics does not seem to have caught up with 
the possibilities of non-linear analysis in general and bifurca­
tion theory in particular.
Clearly the most immediate and glaring short-comings of 
the model that was developed in §2 relates to the abstractions 
from the complications of introducing in an essential way govern­
ment activity and behaviour in addition to open economy consider­
ations. However, as discussed at the end of §2, such essential 
features can be incorporated in an extended version of the model 




























































































including the complications of government activity and open 
economy macrodynamics was technical. Beyond systems of third 
order, to proceed with the sort of computations we have already 
considered in §3, become difficult to interpret in an economical­
ly meaningful way. Other, more formal, techniques - within a 
Hopf-type approach - will have to be used. We indicated some 
possibilities in the general discussion of §2: Centre Manifold
Theory, Generalized Relaxation Oscillations (or the existence 
of non-identical time constants in the system: Synergetics), 
Liapunov-Schmidt reduction, etc.
The political economy of austerity and its analysis requires 
the full consideration of an open economy with government activity 
so that policies that are competitively depressive can be .ex­
plicitly considered in dynamic and disequilibrium models from 
the outset. We consider the model developed in §2 and the 
analysis in 'll as a preface to this more important task.
Even though, scattered, there are some hints about the 
way in which the model we have developed can be extended to 
consider elements of the 'political economy of austerity' 
this is .neither made explicit nor is it sufficient. The more 
glaring of the deficiencies are of course clear: money and
monetary policy are no more than permissive; wealth effects 
are totally ignored; capacity utilization and its analysis 
remains implicit; in addition, the state and relations charac­




























































































albeit with explicit formal hints on the way in which our 
model can be extended to encapsulate such elements.
However, our main objective was to develop a model 
integrating, from the very outset, disequilibrium and dynamic 
elements. In this, at least to some extent, we believe that 
we have succeeded. The extent to which we had to compromise 
in neglecting monetary considerations, wealth effects and 
trade cum exchange rate dynamics remains to be seen when an 
extended model is developed. It is, however, somewhat hearten­
ing to note that this model can be considered canonical in 
the sense that standard fix-price and conventional New 
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